Mobile agents are an important technology in e-commerce systems and offer new possibilities for the e-commerce applications. This paper examines some mobile agent integrity protocols and proposes a new protecting protocol of mobile agent integrity. It can defend most known attacks, provides encryption transmission and route secrecy of mobile agents.
Introduction
Mobile agents are an important technology in e-commerce systems and offer new possibilities for the e-commerce applications. They can provide very flexible approach for information gathering on prices and assets available from the hosts they visit. They can create new types of electronic ventures from e-shops, e-auctions to virtual enterprises and e-marketplaces. Such systems are developed for diverse business areas, e.g., contract negotiations, service brokering, stock trading and many others( [1] ) .
Mobile agent systems have many advantages over traditional distributed computing environments: require less network bandwidth, increase asynchrony among clients and servers, and dynamically update server interfaces, and introduce concurrency and so on ( [2] ). But certain applications have a need for protection of security of the mobile agents. In the mobile agent systems the agent's code and internal state autonomously migrate between hosts and could be easy changed during the transmission or at a malicious host site. A malicious host may expose, modify, insert, delete or truncate data the agent collected from other previously visited servers to benefit itself ( [3, 4] ).
The integrity of an agent means that its code and execution state can not be changed by an unauthorized party or such changes should be detectable. The general goal is to protect the results within the chain of partial results from being modified ( [5, 6, 7] ). To protect integrity some protocols have been proposed in different papers. This paper will examine some protocols and extract general methods from these protocols. As result of this examination the paper will proposes a new integrity protocol for mobile agents. It can defend most known attacks, provides encryption transmission and route secrecy of mobile agents.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related work. Section 3 describes the notations and security properties. Section 4 proposes a new integrity protocol for mobile agents. Section 5 gives security analysis of this protocol. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section 6.
Related work
Forward Integrity denotes the integrity of the partial results. Yee ([8] ) defines the notion of weak forward integrity in the following mode "if a mobile agent visits a sequence of servers S 1 , S 2 , …, S n , and the first malicious server is S m , then none of the partial results generated at servers S i , where i < m, can be forged". In their scheme, an agent and its originator maintained a list of secret keys, or a key generating function. The agent used a key to encapsulate the collected offer and then destroyed the key. However, a malicious host may keep the key or the key generating function. When the agent revisits the host or visits another host conspiring with it, a previous offer or series of offers would be modified, without being detected by the originator.
Karjoth ([9] ), et al. proposed a notion of strong forward integrity where an attacker S m can not forge any of partial results generated at server S i , where i < m, even by colluding with one (or more) other visited server S j , where j < i. In the their scheme, A chain O 0 , O 1 , O 2 , …, O n is an ordered sequence of encapsulated offers such that each entry of the chain depends on the previous and the next members. This dependency is specified by a chaining relation. Their scheme could resist the modification attack but could not prevent two colluders truncation attack. In this attack, a host with the agent at hand colludes with a previously visited host to discard all entries between the two visits.
Cheng ([10] ), et al. proposed a data collection protocol that prevents two colluders truncation attack in a free roaming agent. The protocol is to require an external party, typically the preceding visited host, to co-sign the agent migration. Therefore, two colluders are not sufficient to affect a truncation attack. Their scheme can also be generalized to prevent the L (L 2) colluder truncation attack. The cosigning mechanism But it could not prevent more than L colluders truncation attack.
Darren Xu ( [11] ), et al. proposed a scheme uses "one hop backwards and two hops forwards" chain relation as the protocol core to implement the generally accepted mobile agents security properties. This scheme can defend most known attacks. But if itinerary of mobile agents is protected, it difficult to find the second host forward. 
Notations and security properties

4.6
At the trusted third party T:
To begin the protocol, the originator S 0 randomly generates r 0 . Host S 0 encrypts a dummy offer o 0 and r 0 using its own public key KE 0 . Host S 0 signs this encrypted value to construct a dummy encapsulated offer O 0 . Next, Host S 0 calculates a hash value h 0 from O 0 , and encrypts S 1 using T's public key KE T , and then signs them. Host S 0 also computes a hashed value h A from I A and C A . h A is the certified agent integrity checksum. Host S 0 encrypts this agent using it's the next host's public key KE 1 . Finally, Host S 0 sends h 0 to the trusted third party T and the agent migrates to the first host S 1 .
When the agent arrives at host S i , S i verifies h A in order to ensure the identity I A and code C A were not modified by any malicious hosts. Host S i randomly generates r i . Host S i encrypts o i and r i using the originator's public key KE 0 . Host S i signs this encrypted value to construct an encapsulated offer O i . Host S i calculates a hash value h i from O i , and encrypts S i+1 using T's public key KE T , and then signs them. Finally, Host S i sends h i to the trusted third party T and the agent migrates to host S i+1 .
When the agent returns host S n+1 (S n+1 = S 0 ), S n+1 verifies h A again. Host S n+1 computes a hash value 
Security Analysis
Here we analyze how the protocol achieves the security properties.
Verifiable Forward Integrity: The trust third party T fulfills the forward integrity for each host S i . 
Conclusions
This paper examined some protocols and gives security requirements in mobile agent systems. As result of this examination the paper will proposes a new integrity protocol for mobile agents. It can defend most known attacks, provides encryption transmission and route secrecy of mobile agents.
